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Gender-Intrusive Questioning: A Survey of
Expert Witnesses
Tarika Daftary-Kapur†, Maureen O’Connor*,‡ and Mindy Mechanic§
This paper reports the results of a survey of male and female psychologists with expert
witness experience. The survey explored the roles of both expert witness gender and
valence of the testimony to provide preliminary empirical data on whether gender in
combination with the valence of testimony leads to perceived bias targeted towards
female experts. The presence of such bias might diminish the credibility of the expert
and subsequently the proffered testimony and, thus, undermine the legal system as
effective fact-finder by leading to decision-making based on extra-legal factors.
Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The use of expert testimony “is an increasingly pervasive and controversial feature of
the legal system in the US” (Matoesian, 1999, p. 491). It has both increased in recent
decades, and become a necessary component of criminal and civil trials (Schuller,
Terry, & McKimmie, 2001). The influx of scientific or otherwise complex technical
information inside the confines of the courtroom necessitates the interpretation skills of
an expert. Expert testimony is only admissible if it clarifies previously entered evidence,
or determines an important fact in the case (Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509
U.S. 579, 1993; Krauss & Sales, 2001). For example, in eyewitness testimony, eyewitness
accounts of a crime and subsequent identification of a perpetrator may be overly weighed
by jurors. Expert testimony is believed to sensitize jurors to the “witnessing and identifi-
cation factors that are critical to the evaluation of eyewitness memory, with an increased
likelihood of improved decisionmaking” (Cutler, Penrod, &Dexter, 1989, p. 216). Thus,
the role of experts within the legal domain is an essential aspect to the constitutional
guarantees of a fair trial.
While the proffering of traditional forms of scientific expert testimony in legal
proceedings is not new, increasingly, social science and clinically based expert
testimony addressing sensitive and controversial issues, such as the victimization of
women, is entering the legal arena. Compared with expert testimony on emotionally
neutral topics such as patent or trademark issues, the content of some social science
testimony, particularly victimization experiences, can be described as having a “high
emotional valence.” Moreover, in contrast to other forms of (gender-neutral) high-
valence topics, such as the death penalty, some topics, such as sexual victimization,
have been traditionally identified as “women’s issues” (gendered and high valence)
(see, e.g., Williams, 2003).
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The results of several extensive surveys of gender bias in the courts have consistently
documented bias targeted towards females at all levels of courtroom involvement, e.g.,
female defendants, clerks, attorneys, and judges (Supreme Court Gender Bias Task
Force, 2004). Gender bias was manifested in a variety of ways, including inappropriate
focus on personal aspects of the women’s lives, general discounting of women’s compe-
tence, and women attorneys, in particular, being placed in a double-bind of needing to
appear sufficiently zealous to be competent but avoiding the appearance of stridency
and aggressiveness that is less tolerated in women than in men (Czapanskiy, 1993).
Few of these reports specifically addressed gender bias with respect to expert witnesses,
but where mentioned, the findings seemed to show consistently that judges were
perceived to assign more credibility to male witnesses generally, and to male experts
in particular. In the Minnesota Gender Bias Task Force report, for example, while a
majority of respondents indicated that gender played no role in how judges evaluated
witness testimony, 55% of women attorneys versus 13% of male attorneys believed that
judges assigned more credibility to male expert witnesses (Czapanskiy, 1993, citing
Minnesota Gender Bias Task Force report). In the Maryland state report (cited by
Czapanskiy, fn. 7), of those who responded to a question of whether judges appeared
to give less weight to the testimony of female experts than that of male experts, 43%
of female attorneys, 19% of female court personnel, 9% of male attorneys, and 3% of
male court personnel agreed that the phenomenon occurs, while all but 2% of the
judges reported that this never happens. Unfortunately, data on the extent of such bias
directed towards female experts was not systematically collected during these gender
bias surveys. Nevertheless, additional anecdotal data suggest that female experts (but
not male) may be subject to gender bias, particularly in cases that are gendered and
high-valenced, such as those addressing victimization (see, e.g., Walters, 1994, in
which the seven female experts interviewed all reported experiencing gender bias).
This paper will present the results of a survey of male and female psychologists with
expert witness experience. The survey will explore the roles of both expert gender and
valence of the testimony to provide preliminary empirical data on whether gender in
combination with the valence of testimony leads to bias targeted towards female experts
that might diminish the credibility of the expert and subsequently the proffered
testimony, thus undermining the legal system as effective fact-finder by leading to
decision-making based on extra-legal factors.
Role of Expert Witnesses
Courts have recognized the potentially heightened influence of experts on fact-finders,
particularly juries (Penrod & Cutler, 1989), as they confront scientific and technical
knowledge that is, by definition of expert opinion evidence, “beyond the ken” of the
average juror (Fed. R. Evid. 702). The U.S Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty
in evaluating it,” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993, p. 595). The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “expert testimony may be assigned talismanic
significance in the eyes of lay jurors,” and, therefore, the district courts must take care
to weigh the value of such evidence against its potential to mislead or confuse (General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997; United States v. Frazier, 2004). One of the main reasons that
courts have focused increased attention on the criteria and process for determining the
admissibility and reliability of expert evidence is precisely because they “recognize that
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jurors place special trust in expert witnesses to explain applicable scientific principles”
(Garrett & Neufeld, 2009).
Research on the effect of expert testimony shows that, at least in the laboratory,
experts have mixed effects on juries and do not necessarily represent the level of threat
expressed by the courts. Kwartner (2007) meta-analyzed 29 expert-witness studies and
found that there was a small but significant effect of expert testimony on verdict
decisions. Some studies have found that having an expert testify can influence juror
verdicts (Kovera et al., 1997), but others have found no such influence (Davenport &
Cutler, 2004; Fulero & Finkel, 1991; Levett & Kovera, 2008). Krauss, Lieberman,
and Olson (2004) examined the effect of processing style on jurors’ evaluation of expert
testimony and found gender differences in decision-making, in that their manipulations
worked with males as opposed to females. However, several other studies of college
student mock jurors using simplistic trial transcripts found few differences between
mock juror decisions based on expert testimony of different scientific quality (Guy &
Edens, 2003, 2006). As discussed in the opening article of this section by Neal
(2014), research into the effects of expert gender on decision-making is mixed – at
times, gender influences credibility and the level of persuasion, and at times it does not.
Overall, findings on the influence of expert testimony tend to be content- and context-
driven, and are not consistent across the board.
From the courts’ perspective, one mechanism for keeping the power of the expert
witness in check is through the traditional adversarial safeguard of cross-examination.
Cross-examination has long been considered “one of the fundamental guaranties of life
and liberty” (Kirby v. U.S. 174 U.S. 47, 55, 1899) and an “essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal
(Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 1965). It is “implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation” (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–295, 1974),
and therefore considered an essential constitutional guarantee for those charged
with crimes under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment which gives
defendants the right to confront witnesses who are offering testimony against them.
The purpose of cross-examination is essentially to explore and illustrate weaknesses in
witness testimony and evidence being presented. The main strategies used to discredit an
expert witness through cross-examination include attacking the scientific foundation of
their work, critiquing their educational credentials, exposing weaknesses in their methods
of examination and evaluation (Rogers, Bagby, & Perera, 1993; Ziskin &Faust, 1988), and
highlighting potential bias, such as financial incentives (e.g., money earned by testifying),
that might influence the direction of testimony (Cooper, 2000; Eastson, 2000). As
Commons, Miller, Li, and Gutheil (2012) state, “an expert’s perception of bias
regarding the opposing expert could be used in a critical cross-examination, and cross-
examining in that fashion could “negatively affect an audience’s perceptions of the
cross-examining attorney’s case” (citing Harrison, 2001).
Where opposing sides might not have equal access to expert guidance, or where it is
difficult to challenge the underlying science or reliability of the expert’s testimony,
another strategy might be to resort to the use of personally intrusive questions – and
often gender-intrusive questions – during the cross-examination process (Gutheil,
Simon, & Hilliard, 2001). Through his extensive interaction with and experience in
training expert witnesses, Brodsky (2004) noted that female experts, in particular, are
increasingly reporting being faced with personally intrusive questions. Such questions
might include asking about personal victimization experiences, about family dynamics
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or marital status, or about political stances relating to feminist issues. While an attorney
might justify such questioning during litigation as one strategy to demonstrate an
expert’s lack of objectivity, this form of gendered inquiry could be objected to as
irrelevant to a material fact in the case (i.e., the scientific or clinical basis of an expert’s
evidence), and therefore outside the scope of acceptable cross-examination. Yet
anecdotal evidence and initial pilot data for this survey reveal that such questions do
occur and are either not objected to at all, or allowed by the judge after objection
(O’Connor & Mechanic, 2000).
In the only study to examine experimentally whether intrusive questioning impacts
the credibility ratings of an expert, Larson and Brodsky (2010) found that regardless
of type of questioning (intrusive or non-intrusive), female experts were thought to be
less credible than male experts. Surprisingly, mock jurors also rated the expert who
was asked intrusive questions as being more believable, trustworthy, and credible. At
the same time, the mock jurors in the study seemed to be tuned in to the intrusive
nature of the questioning, and as a result may have discredited the attorney’s line of
questioning. Thus it is still possible that the use of personally intrusive questions, which
are unrelated to the testimony of an expert, may undermine the credibility of that
expert and lead to decision-making based on extra-legal factors as opposed to the
evidence and testimony presented.
Credibility and Expert Witnesses
The credibility of a source can have a significant impact on the persuasiveness of a
message. This becomes all the more salient in the courtroom where the trier of fact is
charged with basing decisions on the facts and on the credibility of witnesses. Some
research has shown that non-expert witness characteristics can influence juror
judgments. For example, Ruva and Bryant (2004) found that age and speech style were
directly related to how credible a witness was judged by participants (the witnesses in
this study were children testifying about a crime, and not experts). In a related study
Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, and Magnussen (2006) found that judges’ assessment of
witness credibility was unrelated to witness emotionality.
A line of research has examined the influence of perceptions of expert witnesses’
credibility on decision-making. The less credible the expert is perceived to be, the less
likely it is that their testimony will be persuasive (Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010).
Some recent research has shown that juror ratings of expert credibility can predict
verdicts and sentencing outcomes (Cramer, Brodsky, & Decoster, 2009). Neal and
Brodsky (2008) compared the credibility of male and female expert witnesses while
manipulating levels of eye contact the witnesses made with the attorney and jury. They
found that female experts were credible regardless of their eye contact level, whereas
men were credible only if they maintained assertive (high) eye contact. Neal,
Guadagno, Eno, and Brodsky (2012) found gender differences when the expert was
rated as low in likeability and knowledge, such that the male expert was perceived as
more credible than the female expert – although these ratings of credibility did not
affect final sentencing judgments.
Relatedly, research has shown that credibility ratings might differ across genders by
case type. Couch and Sigler (2002) had mock jurors read about a civil case involving an
automobile accident where in one scenario the automotive engineer presented was
male and in the other female. They found that male and female experts were equally
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effective and there were no differences in credibility ratings. When complexity of the
evidence was varied and crossed with gender, however, Schuller, Terry, and
McKimmie (2005) found that the male expert was judged to be more persuasive when
the case was complex, whereas the female expert was judged more persuasive in less
complex cases. Similarly, McKimmie, Newton, Terry, and Schuller (2004) found that
the impact of an expert was greater when the gender of the expert was congruent with
the case domain, and this was mediated through ratings of credibility. Overall, it would
appear that there is some impact of credibility on evaluations of expert witnesses.
Taking into consideration an expert’s credibility is appropriate as long as it is limited
to their qualifications to provide testimony in the case. Where this might be an issue
is when credibility is undermined by extra-legal factors, such as bias or personal and
private issues.
Current Study
Very little research addresses the issue of gender-intrusive questioning of experts,
although this process is not rare. Brodsky (1999) discussed categories of questions
female witnesses (not solely expert witnesses) had been asked, which compromised
the witnesses’ privacy. The difference between reported questioning of male and female
experts was attributed to attorneys holding the perception that they could “get away
with” more personally intrusive questions when it came to female witnesses. Although
the results are intriguing, they are restricted to female witnesses in general and not
expert witnesses. Brodsky (1991) addressed the gendered treatment of female expert
witnesses and how to combat this in his treatise, “Testifying in court: Guidelines and
maxims for the expert witness.” He found that women often report being treated in a
demeaning manner when they testify. Additionally, according to Brodsky, “[i]nstead
of being treated with the respect their (women’s) credentials would normally elicit, a
patronizing quality sometimes emerges during depositions and testimony” (p. 65).
In a study of expert witnesses, Gutheil, Commons, and Miller (2001) examined
expert witnesses’ attitudes toward personal questions during cross-examination for
purposes of discrediting and invalidating the testimony. The results indicated that
experts felt questions regarding the circumstances of the expert’s own divorce,
questions about the expert’s own substance abuse problem, alcoholism, religion and
sexuality were all too personal. This study, although informative, does not address actual
experiences of the experts and included an extremely small sample size (n=37). Based on
this limited resource base, and the potentially biasing effects of this type of intrusive
questioning, it is imperative that the experiences of expert witnesses, as well as whether
there is a gendered component to personally intrusive questioning, be examined.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and forty-three psychologists were recruited through the American
Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) listserv. Permission was acquired from AP-LS to
access the listserv. Participants were sent a solicitation email describing the purpose
of the study. Participants were informed that they would be asked to complete a survey
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on their experiences as an expert witness in the legal system. The majority of our partici-
pants were male (63%, n=90), and the majority were Caucasian (95.7%, n=134), with
African-Americans, Asian, and Hispanic making up the remaining 4.3%.
Procedure
In the solicitation email, participants were provided with a link to the survey. The
survey was hosted on surveymonkey.com, a secure data collection website, and took
participants approximately 25minutes to complete (completion times ranged from 15
to 45minutes). All procedures were conducted in accordance with ethics guidelines
of the American Psychological Association.
Measures
The survey instrument consisted of five sections as detailed below.
Demographics
Participants were queried on their experiences serving as expert witnesses in the legal
system. This included questions on the frequency with which they have provided expert
testimony/consultation, and the types of issue for which they have provided testimony/
consultation. Additionally, we asked questions related to respondent age, gender, race,
ethnicity, educational background, and area of expertise.
Routine Legal Questions
Participants were queried on their experiences facing routine legal questions during
their consultation experience. Routine legal questions were operationalized as those
regarding expert objectivity, fees, income, time spent testifying, and credentials. If a
respondent indicated that they had been asked these types of questions, we asked them
to think back to the most recent case in which this had occurred and answer a series of
questions related to that case, including the type of proceeding (civil, criminal), the
stage at which the question was asked (initial consultation, deposition, Frye/Daubert
hearing, other type of hearing, trial, post-trial proceeding), the point in the proceeding
at which the question arose (direct examination, cross-examination, other), the side for
which the expert was testifying, the gender of the attorney asking the question, the
gender of the judge/trier of the fact, and the outcome of the question (whether an
objection was raised, and whether it was allowed).
Intrusive Questions
We then queried participants on whether they were asked questions operationalized as
intrusive. These included questions regarding personal finances, marital status, mental
status, physical abuse, political beliefs, and advocacy. A sample question was, “In your
experience as an expert, have you been asked about your OWN personal marital
status?” If a respondent answered yes to any of these questions, we probed further with
the exact same questions as those in the routine legal question section.
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Gender-Intrusive Questions
In this section we asked participants whether they had been asked questions
operationalized as “gender-intrusive.” This included questions related to children,
sexuality, victimization, feminist beliefs, women’s movement, men’s movement, victim
advocacy, personal experiences with childhood sexual abuse, sexual harassment, sex
discrimination, and partner victimization. A sample question is, “[i]n your experience
as an expert, have you been asked about your OWN personal involvement as an
advocate on behalf of victims?” If a respondent answered yes to any of these




Experts in our sample had served as expert witnesses in some capacity for an average of
17.86 years (SD=8.18; median=20), ranging from 1 to 38 years. On average, respon-
dents had played the role of an expert witness at deposition 55 times (SD=7.51,
median= 20), and at trial 63 times (SD=10.12, median=15). The primary work
setting for respondents was a college, or university setting (30.6%, n=53), followed
by private forensic practice (23.7%, n=41), private clinical practice (13.9%, n=24),
public forensic practice (11.6%, n=20), forensic and clinical practice (9.2%,
n=16), and other (11%, n=20). Areas of expertise ranged from workers’ compen-
sation to eyewitness identification. We classified expertise as to whether it was
gendered in nature (e.g., sexual harassment) or non-gendered (e.g., insanity and
competency). Approximately 17.6% (n=30) of our experts worked in gendered
fields (52% of these were females) and the remaining 82.4% (n=144) worked in
non-gendered fields. Finally, the majority held Ph.D.s (77.5%, n=136), followed
by Psy.D.s (12%, n=22), a combined Ph.D./J.D. (5.6%, n=8) and an M.A./M.S.
(4.9%, n=8).
Data Analysis Strategy
We divided our data analysis into two sections:
• We examined whether there was a difference in the nature of questions asked
(routine legal questions, intrusive questions, gender-intrusive questions) as a
function of gender of the expert, gender of the attorney, and gender of the trier
of fact.
• We examined whether there was a difference in the nature of questions asked as a
function of area of expertise (whether it was gendered or not).
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Gender and Type of Questioning
Do Types of Questions Vary as a Function of Expert Gender?
We examined whether there were any differences in questioning as a function of gender of
the expert – regardless of the type of case, or gender of other parties involved. As
described, questions were divided into three categories – routine legal, intrusive, and
gender-intrusive. With regard to routine legal questions, there were no significant
differences in the number of times male and female experts were queried on these
subjects (see Table 1). With regard to intrusive questions, the only significant
difference was in relation to the question, “[i]n your experience as an expert, have
you been asked about your own personal finances, including bankruptcy, annual income,
not including expert fees?” Male experts were asked this question (10.3%, n=9) at a
significantly higher rate than were female experts (2%, n=1) (χ2(1)=3.13, p< 0.05,
Cramer’s V=0.153).
For questions classified as gender-intrusive, these differences widened. Of the 11
gender-intrusive questions we queried experts on, females were asked four (36%) of
these questions at a significantly higher rate. Specifically, females were more likely to
be asked if they had a history of victimization [7.8% vs. 1.1%, χ2(1)=4.31, p=0.038,
Cramer’s V=0.17], were a feminist [5.8% vs. 0%, χ2(1)=5.30, p=0.021, Cramer’s
V = 0.19], were involved in the women’s movement [5.8% vs. 0%, χ2(1)=4.12,
Table 1. Questioning as a function of expert gender





Time spent testifying 55.1% 69%
Credentials 75.5% 72.9%
Intrusive questions
Personal finances 2%** 10.3%**
Marital status 18.4% 13.8%
Mental status 3.8% 2.2%
Physical abuse 1.9% 4.4%
Political beliefs 1.9% 3.3%






Women’s movement 5.8%* 0%*
Men’s movement 0.0% 1.1%
Advocate for victims 5.7% 5.6%
Victim of childhood abuse 1.9% 0%
Victim of sexual harassment 1.1% 0%
Victim of sexual discrimination 3.8%* 0%*
Victim of partner victimization 1.9% 0%
Percentages indicate proportions within gender.
*Significant at the p<0.05 level; **significant at the p< 0.01 level.
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p=0.035, Cramer’s V=0.17], and were victims of sexual discrimination [3.8% vs. 0%,
χ2(1)=5.19, p=0.025, Cramer’s V=0.21]. See Table 1 for percentages across all
questions asked.
Do Types of Questions Vary as a Function of Gender of Attorney and Trier of Fact?
We examined whether there were differences in the types of questions asked as a
function of the gender of the attorney and trier of fact in the case to which our expert
respondent was referring. We limited this analysis to those who worked in gendered
areas (as defined earlier). Our analyses revealed that there were no differences in the
types of routine legal or intrusive questions asked as a function of attorney gender.
There were, however, significant differences when it came to gender-intrusive
questions. Specifically, when the expert was female, male attorneys (91.7%) were
significantly more likely than female attorneys (8.3%) to ask her gender-intrusive
questions. On the other hand, when the expert was male, female attorneys (54.5%)
were more likely to ask him gender-intrusive questions than were male attorneys
(45.5%). There were no significant differences as a function of gender of the trier of fact
(see Table 2 for percentages).
Specialization and Type of Questioning
Does the Rate of Intrusive Questioning Vary as a Function of Specific Areas of
Specialization?
Type of questioning was examined as a function of the expert’s area of specialization,
specifically whether experts were working in gendered or non-gendered areas (regard-
less of expert gender). Overall, we found that all three categories of questions – routine
legal, intrusive, and gender-intrusive – occurred at a higher rate when the case was
gendered in nature. Specifically, when it came to routine legal questions, experts working
in gendered areas, as compared with non-gendered areas, were more likely to be asked
about their objectivity (100% vs. 72.1%), fees (82.7% vs. 76.3%), personal income
(74.1% vs.48.4%), and percentage of time spent testifying (65.1% vs. 60%).
Table 2. Questioning as a function of attorney and trier of fact gender
Attorney Trier of fact
Sex of expert Females Males Females Males
Routine legal questions
Female 19.4% 80.6% 20.6% 79.4%
Male 31.7% 68.3% 18% 82%
Intrusive questions
Female 9.1% 90.9% 20% 80%
Male 30% 70% 25% 75%
Gender-intrusive questions
Female 8.3%* 91.7%* 9.1% 90.9%
Male 54.5%* 45.5%* 36.4% 63.6%
*Significant at the p< 0.05 level.
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For intrusive questions, we only saw a difference in frequency of questioning in one
area of specialization –marital status. Those who worked in gendered areas (36%) were
more likely to be asked about their own marital status as compared with those who
worked in non-gendered areas (11.2%).
For gender-intrusive questions, we saw significant differences in frequency of
questioning across the majority of areas of specialization. Experts working in gendered
areas, when compared with non-gendered areas, were more likely to be asked about
their children (44% vs. 6.5%), identification as a feminist (3.8% vs. 0%), involvement
in the women’s movement (3.8% vs. 0%), involvement in the men’s movement (3.8%
vs. 0%), history as a victim of childhood sexual abuse (8.2% vs. 0%), and history as a
victim of intimate partner violence (10% vs. 0%). See Table 3 for the breakdown across
all areas.
Does the Frequency of Questioning Vary as a Function of Expert Gender and
Area of Specialization?
Given that we saw differences in questions asked when the case was gendered versus
non-gendered, we wanted to examine whether gender of expert played a role. There
were no significant differences between male and female experts with regard to type
of questions asked as a function of gender and area of specialization for routine legal
questions. For intrusive questions, when it came to the questioning of experts working






Time spent testifying 65.1%* 60%*
Credentials 76.0% 73.8%
Intrusive questions
Personal finances 8% 8.8%
Marital status 36%* 11.2%*
Mental status 3.8% 2.5%
Physical abuse 0.0% 4.1%
Political beliefs 3.8% 2.5%






Women’s movement 3.8%* 0%*
Men’s movement 3.8%* 0%*
Advocate for victims 7.7% 4.9%
Victim of childhood abuse 3.8%* 0%*
Victim of sexual harassment 0.0% 1%
Victim of sexual discrimination 3.8% 1%
Victim of partner victimization 3.8%* 0%*
Percentages indicate proportions within area of specialization.
*Significant at the p< 0.01 level
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in non-gendered areas, male experts (26.90%) were asked more intrusive questions
than female experts (20%); whereas when we considered experts in gendered areas,
female experts (46.10%) were asked more intrusive questions than male experts
(33.33%; see Table 4).
For gender-intrusive questions, regardless of whether the expert worked in a
gendered area, female experts were asked gender-intrusive questions at a greater rate.
Specifically, 27.5% of females were asked gender-intrusive questions when they worked
in non-gendered areas as compared with 14.10% of men; and for gendered areas of
specialization, 46.10% of females were asked gender-intrusive questions, compared
with 33.3% of males. Thus, it seems that when cases are “gendered” in nature, women
get asked more intrusive questions – both general intrusive and gender-intrusive – but
when cases are non-gendered, males are asked more intrusive questions, but women
are still asked more gender-intrusive questions.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to understand the self-reported experiences of
expert witnesses in the courtroom with extra-legal questioning as well as to examine
whether there is a gendered component to personally intrusive questioning. Existing
research has examined a few factors that undermine the credibility of experts and the
differential impact of male and female experts, but there is no research (other than
anecdotal) on the extent of this issue.
Females Were Asked More Intrusive Questions Than Males
Consistent with research on the effect of gender of the expert witness, a greater
proportion of women in our survey than men were asked gender-intrusive questions.
Specifically, women were more likely to be asked if they had a history of victimization,
were a feminist, were involved in the women’s movement (as compared with males
being asked if they were involved in the men’s movement), and were victims of sexual
discrimination. Additionally, experts working in gender-related areas were asked a greater
proportion of intrusive as well as gender-intrusive questions than experts working in non-
gendered areas. Overall, we found that all three categories of questions – routine legal,
intrusive, and gender-intrusive – were reported to occurr at a higher rate when the case
was gendered in nature. This has implications for gendered treatment and endorsement
of stereotypes in the legal arena. In interviews with jurors, Ivkovik andHans (2003) found
Table 4. Questioning as a function of substantive area
Substantive area of expertise
Total Gender-related Non-gendered
Type of question Females Males Females Males Females Males
Routine legal questions 94.34% 94.44% 100% 100% 92.50% 93.5%
Intrusive questions 26.43% 26.21% 46.1% 33.33% 20% 26.9%
Gender-intrusive questions 32.07% 16.67% 46.1% 33.33% 27.5% 14.1%
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that many mentioned the expert’s gender when discussing perceptions of credibility
(although they didn’t link this to their evaluations in an explicit way). Research does tend
to show that male experts are viewed as more credible than females, and it is possible that
intrusive questioning to undermine an expert’s credibility can magnify this effect.
Case Type and Intrusive Questioning
In the experience reported by the expert respondents, it seems it is more common to
ask intrusive questions when the case at hand has “high emotional valence,” involving
topics such as sexual victimization, which have traditionally been identified as
“women’s issues.” In our survey, there were significant differences in the rate of
intrusive questioning as a function of the expert’s area of specialization. Experts
working in gendered areas, as compared with non-gendered areas, were more likely
to be asked about their children, identification as a feminist, involvement in the
women’s movement, history as a victim of childhood sexual abuse, and history as a
victim of intimate partner violence. This is compounded by the fact that women tend
to be disproportionately represented in these areas (24.5% of our female respondents
worked in gender-related areas whereas only 13.3% of our male respondents did). This
may lead to reliance by jurors (or judges) on extra-legal cues when evaluating the
credibility of experts, making it especially concerning for female experts, e.g., the sex
of the expert (research indicates that males are evaluated more favorably than females)
and the intrusive questions (limited research shows that experts who are asked intrusive
questions are rated as less credible).
Gender Dynamic and Intrusive Questioning
One intriguing finding that requires additional exploration is the gender dynamic that
was revealed by our respondents between the sex of the expert and that of the
questioning attorney. In our sample, female experts reported being asked gender-
intrusive questions significantly more often by a male attorney than by a female
attorney, while male experts were asked gender-intrusive questions significantly more
often by a female attorney than by a male attorney. The social influence and power
dynamics of gender composition have received considerable attention in social
psychology, and to some extent in the legal context as well (see, e.g., Carli, 2001; Peresie,
2005; Schuller et al., 2001). Peresie (2005), for example, examined the gender
composition of judicial appellate panels in sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases
and found that the presence of a female judge affected the likelihood that a discrimination
plaintiff would prevail on appeal, while Schuller et al. (2001) found female expert
witnesses to bemore influential where the subjectmatter was considered to bewithin their
knowledge base. This dynamic interaction of gender of the expert and gender of the other
participants in the legal proceeding (i.e., the attorneys, judges, parties) needs to be further
explored. A finding of mere gender differences is insufficient to capture the potential
complexity of these interactions.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study had a few limitations worth mentioning. First, only a small percentage
of the experts surveyed (17.6%) were involved in traditionally “gender valenced” fields.
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Even with this small percentage, we saw differences in questioning across gender and case
type. Additionally, although overall rates of gender-intrusive questioning were low (many
of our percentages were under 20% overall), these were significantly more prevalent in
gendered areas, which is a cause for concern. In general, people tend to underestimate
the frequency of events, and as such it is possible that the surveyed experts experienced
intrusive questioning more often than they reported. Nevertheless, given that differences
in intrusive questioning were seen in this small sample, future research should look to
examine this issue more closely, by focusing more explicitly on experts in gendered fields.
Secondly, our sample consistedmostly of older, male respondents (56% of respondents
were between the ages of 50 and 69years, and 63% were male). This demographic
generally is not the target of gender-intrusive questioning. At the same time, the survey
respondents were representative of the population of experts from which we sampled –
66.5% of all members of AP-LS aremale and 59% are between the ages of 50 and 69 years.
Additional organizational samples of people who provide expert testimony in broader areas
could reveal additional information about the content and process of questioning.
Overall, the results of this study suggest that unequal, gendered treatment of women
is a problem worthy of further exploration. If scientists and clinical professionals are
being called upon to bring their specialized knowledge to legal proceedings, then we
need to better understand barriers that might undermine the effectiveness of that
scientific or clinical expertise. Female experts were more likely to be asked intrusive
questions, regardless of case type. Female experts believed that intrusive questioning
was a common practice, significantly more likely than their male counterparts. It is
imperative that all players in the legal system are aware of this sex role bias and take
steps to reduce it. Female experts should also be aware of the effects of this bias on
perceptions of their testimony and jury decision-making (Brodsky, 1999). Given that
we know that gender-intrusive questioning is a real phenomenon, research should
examine how and under what conditions this line of questioning affects verdicts and
sentencing decisions. If indeed there is a negative effect of intrusive questioning –
whether this effect is on an individual’s credibility, or on the ultimate decision – steps
should be taken to eliminate this additional form of gender bias from the legal arena.
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